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ABSTRACT 
The Arab minority in Israel are in a unique position to contribute to the resolution of the 
Middle East conflict and stabilise relations between the different nations and countries in the 
region. This paper reviews the history of the Arab minority in Israel and reports on their legal, 
socio-economic and political status. It examines relations between the Arab minority and the 
Jewish majority, the Israeli government and the rest of the Palestinian people. On the basis of 
the review, this paper makes recommendations that aim to improve the situation of the Arab 
minority, strengthen the dialogue between the Arab minority and Jewish majority in Israel, 
and enable the Arab minority to act as a mediator in the Middle East peace process.  
 
                                                 
* With colleagues of the Mossawa Center: Raheek Rinawi, Sahira Abbasi, Jafar Farah, Amin Faris, Alhan 
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integral actor in the resolution of the regional conflict. 
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1.  Introduction 
As citizens of the State of Israel and part of the Palestinian people, the Arab minority is in a 
unique position to influence a future resolution to the Middle East conflict. Currently, the 
Arab minority in Israel constitutes 19% of the total population of Israel, as well as 19% of the 
Palestinian people.  
The Arab minority in Israel has been marginalised politically, by both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. To this day, the Arab minority has neither taken an active role in the Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations nor in perpetuating the conflict. Yet this group has already had a 
significant influence on the peace process and has the potential to both support and 
complicate it. 
The political influence of the Arab minority upon Israeli politics is clear. From 1992 to 1995, 
the Arab minority’s representatives in the Knesset gave Yitzhak Rabin the majority necessary 
to continue the Oslo process. In response to the killing of innocent civilians by the Israeli 
Army at Qana in Lebanon, nearly 30% of the Arab electorate boycotted the 1996 Prime 
Ministerial elections, contributing to the defeat of Shimon Peres by Benjamin Netanyahu and 
the freezing of the peace process until 1999. In the 1999 elections, the Arab minority 
overwhelmingly supported Ehud Barak and maintained that support throughout the 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the killing of 13 Arab citizens in October 2000 and the ongoing 
Israeli occupation, influenced the Arab minority to boycott the 2001 Prime Ministerial 
elections. The result was the election of Ariel Sharon and the change of the entire 
government. 
2.  Background 
2.1  History 
The Arab citizens of Israel are the descendants of the Palestinian Arab population that 
remained within the borders of Israel after the war of 1948. After the establishment of the 
State of Israel, some 750,000 out of 900,000 total Palestinians living in Palestine before 1948 
either fled or were expelled from the borders of Israel, becoming refugees in the neighbouring 
Arab states. Virtually overnight, the 150,000 Palestinian Arabs who remained within the 
borders of Israel discovered that they had become a minority in the newly created state.  
Many Palestinian Arab villages were destroyed during the 1948 war. Approximately 25% of 
the remaining Arab population was displaced and became internal refugees. Additional 
transfers of land and people continued throughout the war and in the years immediately after. 
The widely documented cases of Iqrith and Bir’em provide an example of this phenomenon. 
In November 1948, the residents of these two Christian villages on the border of Lebanon  S HIRA KAMM 
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were asked to leave their homes temporarily while the Israeli forces pursued a military 
objective. After complying with the temporary order, the residents were not permitted to 
return and their houses were subsequently demolished. Although the Israeli Supreme Court 
has ruled to restore the property to the residents of Iqrith and Bir’em, the decision has not yet 
been implemented. Additional transfers continued from 1948 to 1951, moving thousands of 
people from villages such as Kufr Yasif, Hassas, Al-Jaouneh, Qatia, Al-Gabsiyeh and Battat 
who consequently became refugees in Arab countries across the Israeli border.  
During the period of 1949-66, the Arab minority was governed by a military administration. 
This administration was carried over from the Emergency Regulations of 1945, enacted by the 
British Mandatory Government. The first Knesset voted to extend the Emergency Regulations 
in June 1949 and appointed three military governors in the Galilee, Triangle and Negev areas. 
Under military rule, the freedoms of the Arab minority were restricted in terms of movement, 
property rights, speech and political organisation. These strict rules included regulations 
permitting the military governors to: close areas and forbid exit and entry without permission; 
enact curfews; detain individuals; place individuals under military supervision or under house 
arrest of an undetermined length; seize property; and, deport individuals out of the country 
without appeal to a civil court. 
One of the most publicised incidents of the military rule occurred in 1956, when the Israeli 
border police killed 49 residents of Kufr Kassem for a curfew violation. The majority of the 
killed and injured were farmers returning from their fields in the evening, who had not been 
informed of the curfew. Historians postulate that this massacre may have been an attempt to 
transfer residents of the Triangle area across the border, at a time when the international focus 
was diverted to the 1956 Suez-Sinai War.  
The military government kept the Arab citizens under close control and suppressed the 
development of political and social organisations. During the years of military rule, the Israeli 
government organised a massive campaign of land expropriation. Villages that had been 
destroyed in the 1948 war were classified as military areas under government jurisdiction. In 
addition, the Absentee Property Law of 1950 disqualified landowners who were displaced 
from their villages from reclaiming their lands. The Israeli government used the Absentee 
Property Law and other legislative programs such as the Israel Lands Administration Law of 
1960, the National Planning and Building Law of 1965 and the Agricultural Settlement Law 
(Restrictions on the Use of Agricultural Land and Water) of 1967 to expropriate Arab land in 
order to use it for Jewish settlement, agriculture and industry. From 1948 to 1975, over 
800,000 dunams were taken from Arab citizens and used for the creation of sixty new Jewish 
villages.  
Although military rule was lifted in 1966, the residual fear of the Israeli government kept the 
Arab minority in silence and submission for some years after. The first expression of 
community protest was in 1976, when the Arab community called the first general strike that 
led to peaceful demonstrations against land expropriations. Demonstrations in Sakhnin turned 
into violent clashes and Israeli security forces killed six Arab citizens. The event is now 
memorialised annually as Land Day (Yom Al-Ard in Arabic) and marks the emergence of the 
Arab minority out of submission and into a national identity.  
The Israel-Lebanon War began in 1982, changing the Palestinian identity from oppressed 
refugee to empowered freedom fighter. The identity of Arabs in Israel began to shift towards 
increased solidarity with the Palestinian struggle and many Arabs saw the PLO as the only 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This view continued throughout the 
intifada years from 1987 to 1993.   T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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The signing of the Oslo accords in 1993 marked a significant change in the Arab citizens’ 
relations with the Palestinians and with the Israeli government. The hope of peace 
strengthened the Arab citizens’ political focus on the pursuit of equality and full citizenship 
within Israel.  
At the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Palestinians in Israel took  to the streets in 
demonstrations of solidarity. These demonstrations were met with high levels of force by the 
Israeli security forces, resulting in the deaths of thirteen Arab citizens. The tragic events of 
October 2000 increased tensions between Arabs and Jews within Israel, threatening to 
complicate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with internal clashes. 
The lengthy and unresolved investigation about the October 2000 killings, along with the 
subsequent killing of 12 Arab citizens, has hindered the healing process between the Arab 
populace and the Israeli government. Meanwhile, the relationship between the Jewish and 
Arab communities has been further strained by widening social, economic and political gaps. 
Legislation passed by the 15
th Knesset, cutting child allowances to those who have not served 
in the military and additional legislation limiting the freedom of speech and political 
organisation by Arab citizens have been at the centre of the growing disparities. 
2.2  Socio-economic situation 
While Israel has become a developed country with an advanced industrial economy and a 
high standard of living, the Arab community has not been fully included in the country’s 
overall development. Inequality in government allocations for infrastructure and improvement 
has led to widespread underdevelopment. Nowhere is underdevelopment and poverty as 
extreme as in the unrecognised villages of the Negev and the north of Israel. Insufficient 
support for the Arab educational system has contributed  to lower levels of educational 
achievement and professional training. As a result, the Arab labour force is highly 
concentrated in lower paid employment. Although the Israeli government has officially 
recognised the significant gaps in socio-economic levels between the Arab and Jewish 
populations, programs to address these gaps have been largely symbolic. 
2.2.1 Infrastructures and development 
The majority of the Arab population in Israel (71%) live in Arab towns and villages – separate 
from the Jewish urban areas in the centre of the country – with the highest concentration 
(46%) in the Western Galilee. Each town or village is administrated by an elected Local 
Council, which is responsible for public education, health and welfare services, public 
transportation and roads, agriculture, industrial development and environmental protection. 
Local Councils are funded by budgets from governmental ministries as well as the collection 
of municipal taxes.  
While the Arab population represents nearly 20% of the total population of Israel, 
governmental ministries regularly allocate less than 7% of their budgets to the Arab 
population. As shown in Figure 1, the Ministry of Welfare allocated 9.8% and the Ministry of 
Education allocated 3.1% of their budgets to the Arab population. This structural 
discrimination, coupled with ineffective tax collection, has led to widespread lack of 
development in the Arab Local Councils, including insufficient educational facilities, poor 
public transportation, outdated sewer and water infrastructures, and low levels of industry. 
According to an analysis by Mossawa Centre Economist Amin Fares, the Arab Local 
Councils are currently running a deficit of 1.5 billion NIS.  S HIRA KAMM 
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Figure 1. Budget allocations to the Arab population by government ministry 
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Source: Government of Israel (2000), State Budget for Fiscal Year 2001, Jerusalem. 
 
The percentage of ministry budgets received by the Arab population may change significantly 
this year, in accordance with the Development Plan for the North. The intention of the 
Development Plan is to increase development budgets for the Arab community by 1 billion 
NIS a year, over the course of four years. Critics of the Development Plan point out that the 
program is somewhat arbitrary, given that the sum for allocation was decided first, then the 
responsibility for allocating budgets was split between the different governmental ministries. 
Further criticism reveals a delay in implementation, as the Development Plan for the North 
was originally authorised in October 2000, but the increased budgets were not included in the 
state budget for 2001. Analysis of the state budget for 2002, however, shows that higher 
budgets have been slated for the Arab sector from many of the ministries. A recent review of 
the 2002 budget by Amin Fares shows that the allocation for Arab sector development was 
only 840 million NIS. 
2.2.2 Work and unemployment 
Lack of employment is another serious issue for the Arab population in Israel. According to 
the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 12% of the Arab workforce was unemployed in 
2000, compared with 7.6% of the Jewish workforce. In the past two years of the conflict, 
unemployment has risen to 10.3% for all of Israel. Amin Fares finds that unemployment is 
even more severe in the Arab sector than reported by the CBS figures and estimates that close 
to 20% of the Arab workforce are currently unemployed, since many Arabs have lost work in 
the Jewish sector due to distrust and prejudice.  
The Arab community is largely concentrated in lower-paid occupations than the Jewish 
sector. The highest concentration of Arab labour is in the building trade (23%), while the 
highest concentration of Jewish labour is in industry (26%). The divergence in the type of  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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employment held within the two communities is reflected in earnings, as the average monthly 
salary in the Arab sector is 4,472 NIS (approximately €800), which is less than 60% of the 
average Jewish salary. A similar gap between the communities exists in other sources of 
income. As a result, income per person in the Arab sector is of 40% of the total income per 
person in the Jewish sector. 
When considering employment issues, it is also important to note that the Arab population has 
a lower level of participation in the workforce than the Jewish population. In 2000, only 40% 
of Arabs of working age (15 years and older) participated in the workforce, compared with 
60% of working age Jews. This difference is largely due to the low level of participation of 
Arab females. While an average of 53% of Jewish females participate in the workforce, only 
15% of Arab females participate. These numbers do not, however, include the Arab females 
who are involved in the unofficial workforce, including seasonal agriculture, caring for 
children and the elderly and domestic work. Many Arab females are willing to work in their 
own villages, but opportunities are nearly non-existent, as much of the textile industry was 
moved to Jordan following the 1995 peace agreement.  
2.2.3 Socio-economic level 
Low wages and unemployment have led to high levels of poverty in the Arab sector. The 
Central Bureau of Statistics regularly assesses the socio-economic level of Local Councils in 
Israel, based on several factors including demographics, levels of education, revenues, income 
and governmental subsidies. Based on these factors, the CBS classifies Local Councils into 
ten socio-economic levels, with one representing the lowest level and ten representing the 
highest.  
As shown in Table 1, the Arab Local Councils are grouped at the bottom of the socio-
economic scale, while the majority of Jewish Local Councils
1 are grouped in the middle 
levels with equal distribution at the low and high ends of the scale. Arab localities account for 
70% of the localities in the lowest four levels (1-4), while Jewish localities account for 94% 
of the localities in the middle three levels (5-7) and 100% of the localities in the top three 
levels (8-10).  
 
Table 1. Arab and Jewish local councils ranked by socio-economic level 
Socio-economic level  Total councils  Arab councils  Jewish councils 
1  10 9  1 
2  37 32  5 
3  31 22  9 
4  30 13 17 
5  31 3 28 
6  17 1 16 
7  19 0 19 
8  25 0 25 
9  9 0 9 
10  3 0 3 
Source: Fares, Amin (2002), Ranking of the Arab Local Councils by Socio-Economic Status, Mossawa Centre, 
Haifa, March. 
                                                 
1 Segregation of the Arab and Jewish communities is the norm except in mixed cities that were integrated prior 
to the establishment of the State.   S HIRA KAMM 
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2.2.4 The ‘unrecognised’ villages 
Poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment are common throughout the Arab community. 
But lack of development is especially extreme in the ‘unrecognised’ villages. These Bedouin 
villages have been in existence since before the establishment of the State of Israel, but have 
not been officially recognised by the government. This disqualifies them from all municipal 
services, including electricity, sewer systems, health clinics, public transportation and roads.  
There are currently 46 ‘unrecognised’ villages in the Negev and the north of Israel. In recent 
years, the government officially recognised eight of these villages located in the north. 
Although this change in status permits the villages to receive municipal services, the 
government has been slow to implement connections. 
The ‘unrecognised’ and ‘newly recognised’ villages suffer from a lack of basic infrastructure, 
including connection to electricity, running water, health clinics and access roads. These 
conditions have a negative impact on health. Infant mortality rates in the ‘unrecognised’ 
villages are 12.1 per 1000 live births. Approximately 50% of the children living in the 
‘unrecognised’ villages are hospitalised during the first year of their lives.  
Some villages run electric generators, but these are sufficient for lighting purposes only. In 
the summer, temperatures in the tin-roofed shacks run as high as 55C, exposing children to 
overheating and dehydration. In the winter, both children and the elderly are susceptible to 
illness due to cold and many children suffer burns from heating fires. Lack of running water 
poses additional health problems, as many ‘unrecognised’ and ‘newly recognised’ villages 
rely on often dry (and sometimes contaminated) sources of water. Lack of sewer systems 
contaminates the local water supply, leading to outbreaks of jaundice and diarrhoea among 
the children. Some villages collect rainwater and many transport water from nearby localities. 
But logistical difficulties in transportation often result in occasional water shortages. Health 
problems in these villages are further complicated by the lack of local health clinics serving 
the population. 
Aggressive government tactics to force this population of nearly 70,000 to move from their 
lands has multiplied the hardships of the ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin. The Israel Lands 
Administration dusted thousands of dunams – containing Bedouin crops, people and animals 
– with toxic chemicals, sending dozens to the hospital in February 2002, and March and April 
2003. Between 2001 and May 2003, the government destroyed 44 homes and hundreds more 
remain tagged for destruction. The government set a new precedent this year with the 
demolition of a Mosque in the village of Tal al Milah,  
The ‘unrecognised’ Bedouin are now faced with a government proposed law, attached to 
Member of the Knesset (MK) Benjamin Netanyahu’s Emergency Economic Plan, entitled 
“The Public Land Law: Removal of Intruders”. With a price tag of 55 million NIS, the 
addition of this law to a plan meant to ease the struggling national economy, signals a sincere 
intention by the government to physically transfer the Bedouin.  
2.2.5 Child poverty 
Approximately one-half of Arab children in Israel live below the poverty line. For poor 
children whose parents are unemployed or who work in low-paying positions, a major source 
of support comes from monthly child allowances allocated to all children in Israel through the 
National Insurance Institute. Nevertheless, child allowances to Arab children are currently 
being cut by 24%, in accordance with an emergency economic package passed by the Knesset 
in 2002. The economic package authorised a 4% cut in allowances for all Israeli children and 
an additional 20% cut for children whose parents did not serve in the army. As Arabs are  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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legally exempt from serving in the army, it is primarily Arab children who will bear the brunt 
of the budget cut. According to a report prepared by the National Insurance Institute research 
centre, this cut will increase child poverty in Israel by 25%. Mossawa Centre Economist 
Amin Fares estimates that in 2003, the effects of the budget cut will increase the number of 
Arab children living under the poverty line to nearly 70%. 
2.2.6 Education 
In Israel, Arabs and Jews attend parallel school systems with different curricula, languages of 
study, school hours and quality of education. Inequality in governmental support for public 
education in the Arab sector have led to classroom shortages, a higher level of unqualified 
teachers, insufficient educational and guidance counsellors, and lack of facilities such as 
libraries, science labs and computer rooms. The average class size in the Arab sector is 30, 
with fewer teachers and classroom hours per child than in the Jewish sector. Furthermore, the 
Ministry of Education estimates that as many as 36% of Arab classrooms are unfit for study. 
Inequality of support for Arab education has resulted in performance gaps between Arab and 
Jewish students. As shown in Table 2, Arab students have higher drop-out rates, lower 
passing rates in the qualifying Bagrut exams and a lower rate of acceptance to universities 
than Jewish students. The numbers shown in Table 2 reflect students aged 17. 
Table 2. Academic success of Arab and Jewish students (in percentages) 
Measures of education  Arab students  Jewish students
Drop-out rates by age 17  31.7%  10.4%
Bagrut pass rates   27.5%  45.6%
Qualification rate for university admission   18.4%  40.4%
University applicants who were rejected  44.7%  16.7%
Source: Human Rights Watch (2001), “Second Class: Discrimination against Palestinian Arab Children in 
Israel’s Schools”, New York, September. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the majority of Arab citizens in Israel have at least a high school 
education. But nearly 35% of Arab citizens do not make it to high school and 8% do not have 
any formal education at all. The majority of this 8% are women, as the Arab patriarchal 
culture regards women’s education as a second priority.  
Figure 2. Years of school completed by the Arab population (in percentages) 
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Source: Government of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (2002), The Arab Population in Israel, Jerusalem.  S HIRA KAMM 
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2.3  Legal status 
The formal legal status of the Arab citizens of Israel has always been unclear, owing largely to 
the double definition of the state as both Jewish and democratic. Although one in every five 
Israeli citizens is a Palestinian Arab, the Israeli government has yet to recognise this group as a 
national minority. Instead, the government refers to the Arab minority as ‘non-Jews’ or 
generally as ‘minorities’. Tensions between the Jewish and the democratic aspects of the state 
have existed since the Proclamation of Independence, which simultaneously declared the 
historic right of the Jewish people to Israel as a homeland and called upon the Arab inhabitants 
of Israel to “participate in the building up of the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship”.  
The double definition of the state as both Jewish and democratic is problematic. Many theorists 
argue that these definitions are mutually exclusive and point out that neither definition has been 
fully realised. Although Israel is defined as the Jewish state, the defining culture of Israel is 
secular, and the political and legal systems are largely independent of Jewish tradition. Judaism 
has come to play a symbolic role in Israel that is expressed in the national holidays, the flag 
(and other national symbols) and in terms of demographics. At the same time, Israel cannot be 
viewed as a complete democracy. Despite the electoral system of proportional representation, 
the Arab minority in Israel has never gained “full and equal citizenship”, whereas a complete 
democracy requires equal rights for all of its citizens.  
As Israel does not have a formal constitution, there is no legal guarantee for equality in civil 
rights. The most commonly quoted section of the Proclamation of Independence states that the 
State of Israel “will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; 
it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will 
ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of 
religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education 
and culture…” Nevertheless, the Proclamation of Independence is not considered a 
constitutional document, so these elegant sentiments cannot be used as a legal instrument.  
Although the authors of the Proclamation of Independence intended Israel to develop a formal 
constitution, the Provisional Government and the First Knesset were unable to complete this 
task. In lieu of a complete constitution, the Knesset started to draft and legislate a series of Basic 
Laws. The assumption has been that the Basic Laws, when completed, would serve as Israel’s 
constitution.  
A total of 11 Basic Laws exist today. The first nine cover the subjects of the Knesset, Israel’s 
lands, the president, the state economy, the army, Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the 
judiciary, the state comptroller and the government. The most recent Basic Laws, covering 
freedom of occupation, and human dignity and freedom, are the first Basic Laws to address the 
human rights issues. Although falling short of a full Bill of Rights, these laws have been 
recognised by the Supreme Court of Israel as taking precedence over other legislation. Further 
draft Basic Laws covering the subject of human rights, including a Basic Law on social rights, 
have been tabled annually due to opposition from the religious parties. No Basic Law exists as 
yet that guarantees equality for all citizens without discrimination on the basis of religion or 
ethnicity.  
The absence of constitutional equality for the Arab minority and the fundamental definition of 
the state as Jewish have permitted a system of structural and institutional discrimination against 
the Arab citizens of Israel. At least 20 Israeli laws discriminate against the Arab minority, either 
by excluding the Arab minority from specific rights given to the Jewish population, (according 
different rights to different sectors of the population) or by abridging the rights of the Arab 
minority. These discriminatory laws touch all aspects of life, including: restrictions on  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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immigration and citizenship; expropriations of land; restrictions on land use and ownership; 
quasi-governmental status given to solely Jewish bodies such as the Jewish Agency and the 
World Zionist Organisation; designations of Jewish symbols and national holidays (while 
ignoring Arab religious dates and holidays); and, laws that mandate separate and unequal 
educational and cultural systems.  
When asked to explain such prejudiced laws, legislators tend to deny that any discrimination 
exists. A typical response compares the living conditions of Arab citizens of Israel with those in 
neighbouring countries and insists that the Arab citizens of Israel should be grateful. Other 
common responses question the loyalty of the Arab minority to the state, arguing that second-
class treatment is all that a fifth of the population should expect and pointing to the Arab 
citizens’ exemption from army service as a justification for discrimination. All of these 
responses demonstrate the contradiction between the definition of the state as Jewish and as 
democratic. As long as the Jewish character of the state dominates over the need for democratic 
equality, the legal status of the Arab citizens will be not be secure. Contrary to popular belief, 
recognition of Palestinian Arabs as an Israeli minority and provision of ‘full and equal 
citizenship’ would not threaten the Jewish right to self-determination, but may act to preserve it. 
Because of the intensified climate of conflict and occupation during the past two years, the legal 
status of the Arab citizens of Israel has come under severe attack. In the past year, several 
legislative proposals were submitted that would retract and limit the rights of the Arab 
community in numerous ways: a bill that would enable state land to be apportioned for Jewish 
use only; a bill to eject Bedouin villagers from their traditional homelands (which the 
government claims as state land); a bill that would exclude Arabs from participating in national 
referendums; a bill that would deny citizenship to the spouses of Arab citizens; and, a bill to 
legalise the physical transfer of Arabs from Israel to the West Bank, Gaza or to other Arab 
states. All of these legislative proposals have been submitted to the Knesset and are currently 
in various stages of debate by the full plenum or in committee.  
Of all the legislative proposals, the most alarming ones have to do with population transfer, 
the idea of physically moving the Arab population to neighbouring Arab countries. In July 
2001, MK Michael Kleiner (Herut) proposed a law to encourage Arab citizens to move to 
neighbouring countries. In September 2001, Minister of Infrastructure Avigdor Lieberman 
(Yisrael Beitenu) proposed a move of Arabs from Israel into the territories. In December 2001, 
MK Benjamin Elon (Moledet) published an article recommending a program of increasingly 
discriminatory laws, to make life in Israel so difficult for Arab citizens as to promote their 
emigration. Current Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has claimed to support the rights of Israel’s 
Arab citizens, yet he has included several pro-transfer MKs in his 16
th Knesset government, 
including MK Lieberman, whose party distributed pro-transfer flyers over the city of Um El-
Fahem during the campaign. 
Many political parties denounce the idea of transfer as both unethical and unrealistic. 
Nevertheless, transfer has become a common concept in the political debate, gaining credence 
in Israeli public opinion and is increasingly proposed as a solution by various right-wing parties. 
According to annual national security poll by the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, 46% of 
Israel’s Jewish citizens are in favour of transferring Palestinians out of the territories and 31% 
favour transferring Arab citizens out of the country. 
The alarming concept of transfer is approaching reality: the 15
th Knesset passed, in its first 
reading, “The Public Land Law: Removal of Intruders”. The measure, if enacted, would 
effectively declare that the Bedouin of the ‘unrecognised’ villages are intruders upon the land 
they have inhabited since before the State of Israel. The goal of the government is to  S HIRA KAMM 
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concentrate the traditionally nomadic Bedouin into fixed settlements, in order to make room for 
new Jewish settlements in the Negev. 
The growing acceptance of intense racism in the legal, political and public arenas demonstrates 
the extent to which Israel has departed from the “full and equal citizenship” for all inhabitants, 
as pledged by the Proclamation of Independence. In the past ten years, the Arab minority has 
developed strong methods of legal and legislative advocacy. Several Supreme Court cases have 
been won, creating legal precedents that guarantee some language, education and religious 
rights. Despite the importance of these landmark decisions, the absence of actual and 
constitutionally mandated equality will continue to permit fundamental threats to the legal status 
of the Arab citizens of Israel.  
The failure of Israel’s democracy to serve its Arab citizens was confirmed by the Israel 
Democracy Institute’s Democracy Index study. The overall conclusion of the study was that 
“Israel is mainly a formal democracy that has not yet acquired the characteristics of a 
substantive democracy”. In relation to the Arab community specifically, there is serious 
political and economic discrimination against the Arab minority. As of 2003, more than half of 
the Jews in Israel (53%) state clearly that they are against full equality for the Arabs; some 77% 
say there should be a Jewish majority on crucial political decisions; less than a third (31%) 
support having Arab political parties in the government; and the majority (57%) think that the 
Arabs should be encouraged to emigrate. 
The following law amendments, passed by the 15
th Knesset, exemplify the manifestation of 
the above findings in the Israeli political system. These law amendments have the effect of 
limiting the Arab citizens’ freedom of speech and political organisation. 
i)  The Law of Political Parties (1992) (amendment 12), 2002. Article 5 of this law is entitled 
“Limitations on Registering a Political Party”. This law sets forth various ideological 
limitations on the registration rights of political parties, similar to Section 7(A) of The 
Basic Law: The Knesset. The new amendment to Article 5 adds the following provision: 
that a political party that wishes to run for the Knesset elections will not be registered if its 
goals or actions, directly or indirectly, “support armed struggle of an enemy state or of a 
terror organisation, against the State of Israel”. 
ii)  The Basic Law: The Knesset (1958) (amendment 35), 2002. Section 7(A), added in 1985: 
“Prevention of Participation in the Elections”. The law sets forth various ideological 
limitations on the ability of political parties to run in Knesset elections. In 2002, the 
Knesset enacted several amendments to Section 7(A). The most important changes in the 
law are that: 1) the provisions now apply not only to political party lists but also to 
individual candidates (subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court); and 2) “support 
of armed struggle, of an enemy state or of a terrorist organisation” was added to the list of 
prohibitions on participation. 
iii) The Law of Election (1969) (amendment 46), 2002. The new amendment to Section 57 of 
the Law of Elections states that a candidate who wishes to run for election to the Knesset 
must declare: “I commit myself to uphold the loyalty for the State of Israel and to avoid 
acting in contradiction with Section 7(A) of The Basic Law: The Knesset”. The main 
purpose of this amendment is to set complementary instructions for the implementation of 
Section 7(A) of The Basic Law: The Knesset. 
iv) Penal Law: Article 144D2 – Incitement to Racism, Violence and Terror (amendment 66), 
2002. On 15 May 2002, the Knesset passed an amendment to Article 144 of the Penal 
Law. The new law prohibits the publicising of “a call for an act of violence or terrorism” 
or supporting such an act. An individual found guilty of this offence can be sentenced to  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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up to five years of imprisonment. The new law also criminalises the possession of a 
publication “which is an incitement to violence or terrorism”. The punishment for this 
offence is up to one year in prison. 
v)  The Law of Immunity of Members of the Knesset: Their Rights and Their Duties (1951) 
(amendment 29), 2002. On 22 July 2002, the Knesset passed an amendment to this law in 
order to “remove any doubt” as to expressions of opinion or actions taken by MKs, which 
are considered to be official acts and part of his/her duties. The new amendment adds to 
the existing law that any statement of action that “supports an armed struggle against the 
State of Israel,” is deemed not to be an official part of an MK’s duties. Statements or acts 
that fall outside of an MK’s duties are not protected by his/her parliamentary immunity 
and thus may be subject to criminal prosecution. 
2.4  Political participation 
2.4.1 History of participation in the Knesset 
In the years immediately following the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab 
population was repressed and restricted to the point of having virtually no political power. In 
many ways, the population was in shock. The 1948 War had caused the emigration of most of 
the political leaders and intellectuals, damaging the foundations of social organisations, 
political movements and the overall political infrastructure. As the population started to 
rebuild these foundations, the military’s strict regulations blocked the formation of new 
political parties.  
From 1948 to 1968, a time characterised by military rule over the Arab population, Arab 
politics in Israel were dominated by lists of those Arabs who were appointed or sponsored by 
Mapai, Israel’s major labour party and by the Jewish-Arab Communist Party. Mapai 
developed these lists on the basis of family leadership, clans and personal favours. In 
exchange for political appointments and other favours, the Arab lists were responsible for 
raising Arab support of Mapai through successful voter mobilisation efforts. The elected Arab 
MKs were largely token figures with minimal political power or clout on behalf of the Arab 
population. 
After the establishment of the state, the Jewish-Arab Communist Party was the only legal 
party that represented the Arab minority independently. It was active against the military rules 
and it suffered from security forces harassment. In 1977, the Communist Party, along with 
independent groups in the Jewish and Arab communities, created the Jewish and Arab 
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, which was the main political force in the Arab 
sector during the 1970s.  
The Jewish and Arab Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE) was the main political 
force in the Arab sector during the 1970s. Following the tradition of the Communist Party, the 
DFPE established several organisations in cooperation with independent groups in Arab 
society, including the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils, the National 
Union of Arab Students and the Supreme Follow-up Committee for Arab Citizens. During 
this time, the Labour and other left parties decided to include Arabs in their membership, 
which increased their influence in the Arab population. 
Al-Ard or ‘The Land’, was the first Arab nationalist movement to develop in Israel. Founded 
in 1959, the Al-Ard movement called for equal rights for all citizens, the end of discrimination 
on the basis of ethnicity and recognition of the UN partition plan. But Al-Ard was quickly 
labelled an illegal organisation, resulting in the closing of its newspaper and the physical 
relocation of many of its leaders out of their home villages.   S HIRA KAMM 
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2.4.2 Arab citizen voting trends 
As seen in Table 3, the Arab electorate, historically, has supported Zionist parties, especially 
those on the left. From 1948 onward, the overwhelming majority of Arab votes went to 
Zionist parties. In 1992, Zionist parties received approximately 60% of the Arab vote. Only in 
1996 did this trend shift, as Arab political parties received over 60% of the Arab vote. In 
1999, Arab parties received approximately 70% of the Arab vote. A history of broken 
promises by Zionist leaders and discriminatory legislation supported by Zionist parties has 
driven a wedge between Arab citizens and Zionist politics. Perhaps the final blow for Arab 
voters took place after the 1999 elections. 
Table 3. Voting preferences among Arab citizens in parliamentary elections, (in percentages) 
Party  % in 1992  % in 1996  % in 1999  % in 2003 
Balad    0.00    0.00  16.80  21.4 
Hadash  23.20    37.00*  21.29  28.8 
Labour  20.30  16.60    7.43    6.3 
Likud  19.30    5.20    4.84    2.3 
Meretz   9.70  10.50    5.02    4.2 
United Arab List   15.20      25.40**  30.55  18.6 
National Progressive Unity 
List 
    Ran with UAL    7.0 
Other***  12.30    5.30  14.07    8.4 
Voter Participation     69.7    77.0    75.0  64.0 
*Includes Balad; **Includes the Islamic Movement; *** Includes Daam, Shas and Israel Baalia. 
 
When Azmi Bishara (National Democratic Alliance) pulled out of the race for prime minister, 
he and other leaders of the party then called upon their supporters to vote for Ehud Barak 
(One Israel-Labour Party). Subsequently, 400,000 Arab votes went to Mr Barak, who won by 
a margin of 350,000 votes. Nevertheless, when Mr Barak formed his coalition government, he 
chose to include parties such as Shas (Haredi), that had opposed him in the elections, rather 
than to include the Arab parties. This move was viewed as a political betrayal in the eyes of 
the Arab minority.  
The subsequent election boycott campaign of 2001, a show of condemnation for unfulfilled 
promises by Prime Minister Barak, was a collective action by the Arab community organised 
by a majority of the Arab parties. Although promotion of an election boycott in Israel is 
illegal, organisers proceeded with little official opposition and the result was a mere 18% 
voter turnout in the Arab community – the lowest tally in the history of the state. This year’s 
62.8% turnout is also historically low. 
In 2003, the Sons of the Village (SOV) party promoted a boycott of the national elections. 
The SOV’s reasons for the boycott were that the illegitimate actions taken by the Jewish 
majority showed that the majority gave no credence to the Arab electorate. Therefore, 
participation in the Zionist political establishment was futile. On the day of election, the SOV 
organised a motor boycott demonstration in the north, for which several of the organisers 
were arrested.  
The above trends were also observed in a 2002 survey conducted by Givat Haviva, the 
Institute for Peace Research. Prior to the announcement of early elections, 47.8% of the Arab 
citizens polled declared their intention to vote. Following the announcement of the early 
elections, the percentage increased to 54.6%. But at the time of polling, as many as 30.0% of  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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those surveyed declared that they would not participate in the elections at all. These results, as 
stated by Givat Haviva, pointed to “the continuing trend of loss of confidence in the Israeli 
democratic system and a feeling that the Arabs do not have the ability to influence it” and 
underscored the survey conducted in 2001 that showed 83% of Arabs shared these feelings. 
Voter abstention in 2003 is also significant, considering the views held by the Arab 
community of Prime Minister Sharon’s government. The same survey revealed that 78.4% of 
respondents evaluated the performance of this government toward the Arab citizens as ‘bad or 
very bad’, 16.4% as ‘fair’, 4.3% as ‘good’ and only 0.9% as ‘excellent’.  
Election results also reveal the ideological inclinations within the Arab sector. In the 1999 
elections, three Arab political parties vied for seats. Since then, the number of Arab parties 
has grown to seven. The 2003 election results show that those parties that broke away from 
the three primary parties were unable to earn enough votes to gain seats in the new Knesset. 
The four ideologies voted into the 16
th Knesset by the Arab electorate are: 
Communist/Socialist (Hadash), National Agenda (Balad) and Islamic (UAL). 
2.4.3 Election results in 2003 
Results of the 2003 Israeli National Elections show that the Balad and Hadash parties have 
gained strength in the Arab sector, while MK Hashem Mahamid and the United Arab List 
(UAL) have weakened. In total, the 16
th Israeli Knesset will seat ten MKs who will represent 
the Arab community, down from 14 in the previous Knesset (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Number of Knesset MKs who represent the Arab community, per party 
Party  1999  2003 
Hadash 3  3 
United Arab List  5  2 
Balad 2  3 
Labour 2  0 
Meretz 1  0 
Likud 1  2 
National Progressive Unity List  0 
(w/UAL) 
0 
(20,571 Votes)  
Daam 0 
(2,151 Votes) 
Did not earn min. 
required 
 14  10 
 
Arab voter turnout reached 64.0%. In 1999, 75% of Arab voters cast ballots; in the 2001 
Prime Ministerial elections, 18% of Arabs participated (see Figure 3). The lowest 
participation rates for this election were in the ‘unrecognised’ villages of the Negev. The 
Mossawa Centre reported to the Central Election Committee that the voting places for ten 
Arab localities in the Negev had been moved without prior notice, resulting in a 0% 
participation rate in these areas.  
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Figure 3. The Arab electorate’s participation in national elections from 1949 to 2003 
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Disappointment was felt among the thousands of Arabs citizens whose votes were lost with 
the National Progressive Unity List, earning less than the 1.5% of total votes necessary to win 
a seat. The following Arab MKs lost their Parliamentary seats: Tawfik Khatib (United Arab 
List), Mohamad Kinaan (United Arab List), Saleh Tarif (Labour) and Hosnie Jebara (Meretz). 
The following are newly elected MKs representing the Arab community: Jamal Zahatka 
(Balad), Wasil Taha (Balad) and Wihbi Majali (Likud). 
2.4.4 Political delegitimisation and the 2003 elections 
The climate in the Knesset reflects the escalating tensions between Arabs and Jews within 
Israel. The general atmosphere has become intolerant, permitting a growing trend of laws that 
seek to affect the political legitimacy of the Arab minority. In the past two years, several laws 
have been passed that limit and restrict the Arab minority’s freedom of speech and political 
organisation. Changes in the Party Law forbid political parties to express support for 
resistance against the occupation and were used to disqualify Arab parties from participating 
in the upcoming national elections.  
The Central Elections Committee (CEC) utilised these laws to disqualify the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA) and its leader, MK Dr. Azmi Bishara, from the national elections 
on 28 January, 2003. Dr. Ahmad Tibi, an MK from the Ta’al party was also disqualified. The 
action succeeded despite the decision of the CEC Chairman, Supreme Court Justice Michael 
Heshin, who found that no evidence existed to substantiate the disqualification. 
A coalition led by an Arab High Follow-Up Committee and the Mossawa Centre 
demonstrated outside the Supreme Court building on the day of the hearing. Jewish and Arab 
organisations participated along with individual activists in support of the Arab parties’ 
politicians and to encourage the Supreme Court’s eventual rejection of the CEC’s decision.  
Regardless of the positive outcome in the Supreme Court, the action taken by the CEC was, in 
effect, an attempt to limit the freedom of speech of the Arab citizens and their political 
leadership. The action, added to the Basic Law amendments noted above, shows that the 
Israeli government has consistently challenged the ability of the Arab citizens to organize 
themselves politically in recent years.  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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3.  The role of Arab citizens of Israel in the Middle East conflict 
3.1  Relations between Palestinian-Arabs in Israel and the West Bank/Gaza 
The 1948 War, known to Jewish Israelis as the ‘War of Independence’, is known to the 
Palestinians as El-Nakba, ‘The Catastrophe’. Indeed, the 1948 War was a catastrophe for the 
Palestinian Arabs. Over 80% of the Palestinian Arab population fled or was forcibly expelled 
from the borders of the new State of Israel. The remaining Palestinian Arabs were mostly 
rural villagers, many of whom were displaced from the approximately 418 destroyed villages 
and became internal refugees.  
From 1948 to 1967, there was minimal contact between the Arab population in Israel and the 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. Although the Arabs in Israel were issued 
Israeli citizenship, their rights were strictly limited through the regulations of the military 
government. Freedom of movement was restricted even within the borders of Israel, let alone 
across enemy borders. Military rule ended in 1966, one year before the 1967 War and Israel’s 
annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Transjordan. Since then, the occupied 
territories have remained under military rule.  
The 1967 War reconnected the regions of the Palestinian people living in Israel and those 
living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Although the Arabs in Israel opposed the Israeli 
annexation and occupation of these territories, the erasure of the border created opportunities 
for family reunifications, exchanges of labour and goods, studying at Arabic universities in 
the West Bank and other social, cultural and economic exchanges. Israel’s annexation of the 
Gaza Strip in 1972 created similar opportunities for the Arabs living in the Negev and the 
Palestinians in Gaza.  
Over the years, the extent of contact and exchanges between the Palestinians in Israel and the 
West Bank and Gaza developed in many aspects. Thousands of Palestinians from the West 
Bank and Gaza were permitted to work in Israel, creating a pool of low-wage labourers and 
improving the economic situation in the territories. Arabs in Israel went to the West Bank for 
low-priced shopping and restaurants. Marriages were arranged between couples from either 
side of the border and families assumed that they would be able to visit one another regularly. 
Many students from Israel chose to study at universities in the West Bank and Gaza, due to 
the absence of Arabic universities in Israel. These multi-faceted contacts built a relationship 
between the Arabs in Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, despite their 
social, economic and political differences and the intense disparity in their standards of living.  
The first intifada erupted in December 1987. Characterised by massive popular resistance in 
the form of strikes, boycotts, stone-throwing and the building of independent infrastructures 
(such as the Agricultural Relief Committee and the Local Committees),  the intifada 
galvanised the Palestinian people. The ongoing and steadfast nature of the resistance created 
an empowered national identity and brought the Palestinian issue to the forefront of 
international awareness. As the intifada continued, the Arabs in Israel used their position as 
Israeli citizens to support the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza with demonstrations of 
solidarity. They put forth Palestinian perspectives in Israel, sent food, medicines and funds as 
humanitarian aid. The Arab political parties within Israel largely organised these efforts. 
The signing of the Oslo accords in 1993 sent a message to the world about of the eventuality 
of an independent Palestinian state. This created a new hope among the Arab minority in 
Israel for an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Although supportive of the peace 
process and the right for Palestinian self-determination, the Arabs in Israel saw their own 
future as equal citizens of Israel and not as citizens of the Palestinian state. The Oslo accords  S HIRA KAMM 
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actually strengthened the drive for recognition as a national minority and for equal rights, 
along with the demand for budget allocations and equal treatment under the law. 
When Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership came to the Palestinian territories in 1994, the 
stage was set for establishing formal political relations between the Arab leadership in Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority. Activities that resulted from these relations have included the 
exchange of political assessments and analyses, the presentation of and support for Palestinian 
perspectives within Israel and lobbying efforts on behalf of the Palestinian cause within the 
Knesset. The PLO’s formal recognition of the Supreme Follow-up Committee for Arab 
Citizens as a legitimate representative, reflected the general consensus among the Arab 
minority in Israel of their political independence from the Palestinian Authority, especially 
regarding the political agenda of equal rights in Israel.  
During the late 1990s, the political leadership of the Arab minority in Israel also succeeded in 
building relations with neighbouring Arab countries. Large delegations of Arab citizens of 
Israel visited King Hussein of Jordan in 1998, 1999 and 2000, and similar delegations met 
with former Syrian President Hafez Assad and current President Bashar Assad. These visits 
were particularly significant, as the delegations included Arab members of the Knesset, with 
whom the Arab nations had previously refused to meet, viewing them as integral parts of 
Israeli institutions. The normalisation of relations with Israel remains an intensely debated 
issue in the Arab world. Despite the links that the Arab minority has established with Arab 
countries, the Arab minority in Israel is still largely viewed with suspicion and distrust, 
especially among the movements against normalisation of relations with Israel.  
The Al-Aqsa intifada broke out in October 2000, expressing years of frustration over the 
failure of the Oslo accords to make real changes for the Palestinian people. Israeli security 
forces reacted with intense displays of force, creating a cycle of retaliation with the 
Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority. Arabs in Israel took to the streets in demonstrations 
of solidarity and the National Committee for Arab Citizens declared a general strike. These 
demonstrations were also met with high levels of force by the Israeli security forces and 13 
Arab citizens were killed by rubber bullets and live ammunition, used to control the 
demonstrators.  
Since October 2000, Israeli security forces have killed an additional 12 Arab citizens. A 
Mossawa Centre investigation revealed that most of these individuals were involved in 
routine daily activities, such as returning from work and were unrelated to demonstrations or 
criminal actions. Arabs within Israel fear that this type of policing, characterised by such use 
of excessive force, will become the usual approach to dealing with Arab citizens in Israel. 
As in the first intifada, the Arabs in Israel organised humanitarian aid for Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza, setting up collection points for food, clothing and medical supplies in 
Arab villages throughout Israel. These shipments of aid were then transported by truck and 
car to the border to be met by contacts on the other side. Due to physical proximity, many of 
the humanitarian shipments from Israel were able to reach the Palestinians in the West Bank 
even when international humanitarian aid was blocked at the border.  
The Al-Aqsa intifada has reopened questions about the identity and loyalties of the Arabs in 
Israel. For many Arab citizens of Israel, the violent events of October 2000 were a turning 
point towards the realisation that Israel will always see them as an unwelcome population and 
a security threat, rather than as equal citizens. The killing of the 25 citizens is seen as proof of 
the government’s prejudice against the Arab minority and as a violation of human rights.  
The community’s overwhelming response has been to protest this prejudice through official 
channels within the framework of the Israeli government, including the establishment of a  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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commission of inquiry, a massive boycott of the prime ministerial elections and joint 
advocacy with international bodies to request intervention. The community’s intense feeling 
of betrayal by the Israeli government has also increased sympathy and identification abroad 
with the Palestinian struggle for independence.  
3.2  Relations between Arabs and Jews within Israel 
The most salient feature of relations between Arabs and Jews within Israel may be their 
separation. Arabs and Jews are separated by location, cultural differences and lifestyles, 
language, education, employment and occupation.  
For the most part, Arabs and Jews live in different parts of the country. Arabs are 
concentrated in smaller towns and villages in the Galilee and the Negev, while Jews are 
concentrated in larger cities and suburban areas in the centre of the country. These towns and 
cities are largely homogenous. Only a few cities in Israel – mostly those which were mixed 
prior to 1948 – are considered “mixed cities”, a term describing an urban area with a 
significant minority of Arab, Haifa, Lod and Acre residents. Yet separation is still a factor 
even in these so-called mixed cities, where Arab and Jewish residents live in ethnically 
homogenous neighbourhoods and have little interaction with members of the other ethnicity. 
Cultural differences and language create another element of distance. While Jews celebrate 
the nationally recognised Jewish holidays (Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, Shavuot, Sukkot 
and Pesach), Arabs observe the Christian, Muslim and Druze holidays (Easter, Christmas and 
Ramadan), which are not officially recognised by the state. Different traditions of observing 
the Sabbath is noticeable on weekends, when Muslims work a half-day to observe the holy 
day on Friday, shops and streets are closed in Jewish cities to recognise the Jewish Sabbath 
and Christians observe the Sabbath on Sunday.  
The responsibility of overcoming the language barrier has been placed on the Arab minority. 
Although Israel recognises both Hebrew and Arabic as official national languages, public life 
in Israel is conducted in Hebrew. Government offices and publications are published in 
Hebrew. Road signs often exclude Arabic. Business and commerce are conducted almost 
solely in Hebrew.  
The language difference is reinforced by separate and parallel school systems. Arab students 
are taught the major subjects in Arabic, but there are extensive Hebrew requirements for 
graduation, matriculation and acceptance to university. Matriculation exams and university 
studies are offered in Hebrew only, as there is no Arabic university in Israel. Meanwhile, 
Jewish students learn in Hebrew, with a minimal requirement to study Arabic at the same 
level as any other foreign language. 
In addition to the physical, cultural and linguistic separations noted above, one of the most 
significant factors of the Arab-Jewish separation is army service. The army is the major 
integrating element in Israeli society, bringing together and bonding youth from different 
cultural backgrounds. Legally, all Jewish citizens are obligated to serve in the army. 
Approximately 21% of the Jewish draft-age population does not serve, due to exemptions for 
religious study or medical reasons. Meanwhile, the majority of Arab citizens are legally 
exempt from military service, with the exceptions of the Druze and Circassian communities. 
Previous army service is often used as a qualification for employment, renting apartments or 
for community membership. Without explicitly saying so, using army service as a 
qualification is a means of excluding Arabs from applying for jobs, apartments, etc.  
The physical and cultural separation of Arabs and Jews has resulted in the development of 
two separate communities within Israel. This is reflected in the business sector, where Jewish  S HIRA KAMM 
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companies work primarily with other Jewish companies, while Arab businessmen struggle to 
break into the market. Unequal levels of education and discrimination in employment have 
forced the Arab population into low-paying, physically demanding occupations, while the 
Jewish population dominates the public and business sectors.  
Socio-economic factors have influenced the stereotypes that each group holds about the other. 
Common stereotypes cast Arabs as menial labourers, potential thieves and generally 
untrustworthy people. These stereotypes are prevalent throughout Israeli society, to the point 
that menial labour is described as “Arab work” and children in schools are instructed “not to 
act like Arabs”. Many Jews do not differentiate between Arab citizens and Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza, and are quick to see all Arabs as a security threat. On the other side, 
common stereotypes cast Jews as cold, inhospitable people, as racists  who discriminate 
against the Arab community and as slick-talkers who make promises but do not keep their 
word.  
Although integration is a heralded ideal in many Western countries, it has never been an ideal 
in Israel. The majority of Arabs and Jews in Israel prefer to live in separate communities, in 
order to preserve their culture, religious traditions and ethnic integrity. Examples of 
integration are few and far between in Israel, with more symbolic value than actual influence 
on the society. Coexistence communities such as the Arab-Jewish Oasis of Peace and 
educational experiments such as the Bi-lingual School in Jerusalem have a significant impact 
on the participants and their families, but remain a marginal phenomenon. 
The most common fear of integration is that it will lead to intermarriage. As the State of Israel 
does not recognise religiously mixed marriages, there are no official statistics about the 
prevalence of intermarriage. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence reveals a small incidence of 
intermarriage, often within the context of a university or left-oriented political circles – two of 
the few fora where Arabs and Jews interact as peers. Couples who dare to cross the ethnic 
boundary face high levels of prejudice from both their families and societies, and are often 
forced to break ties. 
A poll conducted in 2002 by Badi Husseisi and Ami Podhozer of the Haifa University shows 
that 90% of Jewish respondents would not permit a member of their family to become 
romantically involved with an Arab. The poll sample of Jewish Israelis and participants were 
asked whether they agree with the following statements about social relationships with Arabs: 
•  I would not work for an Arab supervisor – 60% agreed; 
•  I would not host an Arab in my house – 47% agreed; 
•  I would not permit a member of my family to become romantically involved with an 
Arab – 90% agreed; 
•  I would not allow Arabs to live in my neighbourhood – 69% agreed; and 
•  I would prefer to break off all contact with Arabs – 64% agreed. 
Compared with similar studies conducted in the past, the above results reveal that Jewish 
attitudes towards the Arab minority have grown more negative and extreme in recent years.  
The past two years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have had a terrible effect on relations 
between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority within Israel. Both communities suffer 
from the nearly daily occurrence of violence and live in constant fear and anxiety. Jewish 
Israelis have projected their anger and distrust onto the Arab minority, associating them with 
terrorists and viewing fellow citizens as a potential threat to security. Meanwhile, Arab citizens 
identify with the Palestinian struggle for independence and feel increasingly isolated from the 
policies and actions of the government.  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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The readiness of Jews to view Arabs as a security threat was shown in the events of October 
2000. As thousands of Arab citizens joined popular demonstrations against the occupation, 
Israeli security forces cracked down on the rowdy crowds with extreme levels of force, using 
live ammunition and rubber-coated bullets to disperse the crowds. As noted previously, 
during the first week of October the Israeli security forces were responsible for the deaths of 
13 Arab citizens. The double standard of treatment for Jewish and Arab citizens was clear. In 
contrast, when Jewish citizens were involved in similar demonstrations and even in 
destructive riots, Israeli security forces used tear gas and water cannons, never resorting to 
live ammunition. In the past two years, Israeli security forces have “mistakenly” killed an 
additional 12 Arab citizens, while security forces have killed no Jewish citizens, even in crime 
situations. 
Race-related violence and racist public speech have also become serious issues in the past two 
years. After major suicide bombings, members of the Arab minority often become targets of 
Jewish anger, resulting in harassment, assaults, vandalism, arson and the destruction of Arab 
homes and property. Every week, the Arabic press in Israel reports two or three incidents of 
race-related violence. Yet the Hebrew press in Israel pays little attention to these incidents.  
Meanwhile the Hebrew press has reported almost hysterically about the alleged increasing 
involvement of Israel’s Arab citizens in the support of violent activities. Ignoring the concept of 
“innocent until proven guilty”, the Hebrew press has seized on every alleged incident with the 
intensity of a witch-hunt. Although the involvement of the Arab minority in such violent 
activities remains marginal, the treatment of these activities in the media and the public 
discourse creates an impression of collective guilt and obliges their leadership to issue 
repeated apologies and condemnations. 
Although the majority of Arabs and Jews seem to prefer separation to integration, the lack of 
meaningful interaction between the two communities has led to stereotyping and distrust. The 
intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been reflected internally in the fragile, amicable 
relations, which are on the verge of completely breaking down. 
4.  Vision of the future 
4.1  The Arab minority and the resolution of the regional conflict  
4.1.1 Role in the peace process 
As part of the Palestinian people and citizens of the State of Israel, the Arab minority in Israel 
is in a unique position to promote dialogue and bridge the gaps between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis. Through their identification with the Palestinian struggle and their experience as a 
minority suffering from discrimination, the Arab minority is better able to understand the 
needs and demands of the Palestinian people than the Jewish majority and leadership. Equally 
through the experience of living with Jewish citizens, participating in the Israeli political 
system and exposure to Hebrew news and media, the Arab minority is better able to 
understand the perspectives of the Israelis than the Palestinian people and leadership.  
Until now, the Arab minority has not exerted enough effort to communicate these views, 
either through outreach to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza or to the Jewish 
majority in Israel. Faced with the urgent needs to support the Palestinians with humanitarian 
aid and to defend their own civil rights against racism, the Arab minority has taken a reactive 
rather than proactive position. Nevertheless, this does not justify the silence. Through internal 
dialogue and community organisation, the Arab minority should develop messages that 
incorporate their unique understanding of both the Palestinian and Israeli perspectives and 
make efforts to communicate these perspectives to the other.   S HIRA KAMM 
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4.1.2 Internal dialogue 
The identity of the Arab minority in Israel is complex. As Palestinians, the Arab minority is 
the historical part of the Palestinian people that remained in the homeland. Although 
culturally Arab, the Arab minority are largely disconnected from the other Arab countries, 
with minimal acceptance, communication or freedom of movement. Although they are 
citizens of Israel, the Arab minority is not integrated into Israeli society and faces social, 
political and economic discrimination. And even within the Arab minority, religious 
differences between Muslims, Christians and Druze threaten understanding and unity. 
Although the Arab minority in Israel seems like a small group, it encompasses over 1.2 
million people, concentrated in different areas of the country, with different cultural 
affiliations, lifestyles and even different linguistic dialects. Political movements within the 
Arab minority have different views about what is in the community’s best interest, from 
integration on the basis of civic equality to separation on the basis of national identity or the 
establishment of a society based on the religious values of Islam.  
While the Arab minority has reached consensus on several issues, the need for dialogue 
within the Arab minority is clear. Such a dialogue should include leadership and community 
members in an ongoing discussion about the identity of the Arab minority, its political 
aspirations, goals, needs, abilities and resources. The results of this dialogue should enable the 
Arab minority to better organise and coordinate itself, fostering proactive involvement in the 
resolution of the conflict alongside its struggle for equal rights.  
4.1.3 Democratic participation and unity 
Citizenship entitles the Arab minority in Israel to participate in the democratic institutions of 
the state and to use these democratic institutions to promote equality. The democratic 
instruments available to the Arab citizens include: voting in local and national elections; 
organising political parties and movements; advocating equal rights legislation; organising 
coalitions and cooperating with other groups; creating legal precedents in the judicial system; 
and, protesting through public statements, boycotts and strikes. 
Until now, the Arab minority has not developed a civil rights action plan, coordinated by the 
community leadership nor fully utilised the available democratic instruments and strategies. 
Fragmentation of the community along religious, ethnic and territorial lines has prevented the 
Arab political parties from close cooperation, thereby diminishing their political leverage in 
the Knesset. Massive community mobilisation has largely focused on joint protests, including 
demonstrations, boycotts and strikes. But if the Arab minority focuses on negative methods 
such as boycotting the elections, the result may further isolate and undermine the political 
legitimacy of the Arab community. The struggle for equal rights requires cooperation and the 
use positive methods as well, to unite the strengths and resources of different streams on 
behalf of the community as a whole.  
4.1.4 Building the capacity for a civil society 
The establishment of the State of Israel resulted in the destruction and repression of the Arab 
minority’s social and political infrastructures. As the Arab minority emerged from the 
decades of submission under military rule, it began to rebuild these infrastructures, setting up 
national coordinating bodies, political parties and independent movements. In the past decade, 
the Arab minority has responded to the unequal and insufficient support of the government by 
establishing a multitude of civil society organisations working in the fields of social welfare,  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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education, health, the environment, care for children and the elderly, women’s rights and 
others.  
The existence of these civil society organisations does not remove the responsibility from the 
state to provide adequate public services to the Arab minority. Nevertheless, the development 
of these organisations is an important step for the professional and societal growth of the Arab 
minority. The experience of participating in these organisations and engaging in needs 
assessment and community planning is teaching the Arab minority self-reliance. Building the 
capacity of these organisations will not only provide better services to the Arab community 
but promote the democratic and cooperative aspects of the Arab society in Israel. 
4.2  Recommendations to the Israeli government 
4.2.1 The Arab minority as mediators in the Middle East peace process 
The past two years of intense violence and conflict have almost completely destroyed the 
Middle East peace process. In the current climate of Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli 
military incursions which cause innocent civilian deaths, it is unclear when the sides will be 
able to return to the negotiating table. It is clear that a fundamental reason for the present 
failure of the peace process is the lack of understanding between the two sides. Issues that one 
side regard as central to the resolution of the conflict, such as the Palestinian right of return or 
sovereignty over holy sites in Jerusalem, are not regarded as legitimate subjects for 
negotiation by the other side.  
The Arab minority in Israel is in a unique position to mediate between the Israeli and 
Palestinian sides of the Middle East conflict. Identification with the Palestinian experience 
and culture, coupled with the experience of Israeli life and citizenship, gives the Arab 
minority a deep understanding of each side of the conflict – a fundamental necessity for 
mediation. When the Palestinians and Israelis are finally able to return to political 
negotiations, the Arab minority should be utilised in roles as translators, consultants and 
mediators.  
4.2.2 Recognition of national minority status 
Since the establishment of the state, the Israeli government has not officially recognised the 
existence of a distinct national minority and has referred to the Arab population as “non-
Jews” or “minorities”. This vague definition has permitted the development of vastly 
disparate approaches to the Arab minority, from the advocates of forced physical transfer to 
preserve the ethnic purity of the state, to the advocates of completely renouncing the Jewish 
character of the state in favour of a democratic and bi-national state.  
Neither of these extreme approaches is acceptable. Forced physical transfer is not a morally 
justifiable option. And renouncing the Jewish character of Israel is not realistic for a state 
explicitly founded as homeland and refuge for the Jewish people. Israel must find a middle 
ground and clearly define the character of the state somewhere on the spectrum between 
Jewish and democratic. As part of this process, Israel must recognise the presence of the Arab 
population in Israel as a distinct national minority. This includes enshrining the equal rights 
and citizenship of the Arab minority in the Basic Laws and incorporating these principles of 
equality consistently throughout official legislation and its practical implementation. The 
most urgent issue to be addressed, after the recognition of equality and full citizenship, is the 
full recognition of the land rights of the residents in the ‘unrecognised’ villages. 
As part of the official recognition of the Arab minority, it is important to address the 
controversial issue of compulsory military service. Arab citizens of Israel are legally exempt  S HIRA KAMM 
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from military service, on the basis that the Arab citizens should not be forced to bear arms 
against their own people. Nevertheless, as full citizens of the State of Israel and entitled to all 
of the rights and benefits of citizenship, the Arab citizens of Israel must also be obligated in 
citizenship duties. Accordingly, the Israeli government and the representatives of the Arab 
minority must discuss the issue of compulsory military service and consider options such as 
non-military national service within their own community as an alternative. Without programs 
addressing all aspects of citizenship and equality, the Arab citizens will remain in an 
undefined and second-class status. 
4.2.3 Education for tolerance and democracy 
It is the responsibility of the Israeli government to incorporate tolerance and democracy in 
education. Programs that include democracy education in schools, mixed youth and 
community groups for dialogue and institutions for cultural exchange should not be the 
responsibility of non-profit organisations. Such programs should be implemented on a large 
scale with governmental support to give them social legitimacy.  
4.2.4 Development and investment 
While Israel has become a developed country with an advanced industrial economy and a 
high standard of living, the Arab sector has not been fully included in the country’s overall 
progress. There are wide gaps between the Arab and Jewish communities, with the Arab 
community suffering from insufficient infrastructures in education, agriculture, industry, 
health and social welfare. Lack of development and poverty are especially extreme in the 
‘unrecognised’ villages in the Negev and north of Israel.  
Although the Israeli government has officially recognised the significant gaps in socio-
economic levels between the Arab and Jewish populations, programs to address these gaps 
have been largely symbolic in nature. The Israeli government has a history of promising 
budgets to the Arab sector but not following through with the implementation. This history 
has left the needs of the Arab sector unaddressed, creating health and educational problems. 
Consequently, feelings of betrayal and resentment among the Arab community have been 
compounded, along with the sense that the Israeli government cannot be trusted. 
The Israeli government should devise a comprehensive plan to address the development needs 
of the Arab minority. Based on a survey and needs assessment, the plan should include the 
input of the Arab leadership and localities. Furthermore, the plan should be directed by a 
steering committee composed of development experts, Arab representatives and government 
officials to keep the implementation timely and on track. By addressing the urgent 
development needs of the Arab minority, the Israeli government will take a first step towards 
building relations based on trust and mutual cooperation.  
4.3  Recommendations for Europe 
4.3.1 Barcelona process and the EU-Israel association agreement  
In 1995, the European Union and the Mediterranean countries launched the Barcelona 
process, creating a European-Mediterranean Partnership for regional cooperation and 
exchange in the areas of politics, security, economics, trade, social and human issues. The 
first priority of the Partnership is to promote a regional political dialogue that advances peace 
and security. The Barcelona process also aims to establish a free-trade area, based on 
association agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean countries and trade agreements 
between each of the Mediterranean countries. As part of the Barcelona process, the EU  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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developed association agreements with several Mediterranean countries, including Israel, 
Morocco and Tunisia. 
Article 1 of the association agreement between the EU and Israel states that the aims of the 
agreement are to: provide a framework for political dialogue; promote harmonious economic 
relations; encourage regional cooperation with a view to peaceful coexistence and economic 
stability; and cooperate on other issues of reciprocal interest. Article 2 speaks of the essential 
elements of human rights and democratic principles as the basis for the agreement and a guide 
for all internal and international policy. 
4.3.2 The European Commission 
Although the association agreement includes the aspects of peaceful coexistence, democratic 
principles and human rights, the agreement does not mention the Arab minority in Israel. The 
programs and cooperation included in the association agreement have been conducted with 
the Israeli government, without sufficient outreach or inclusion of the Arab minority. The 
liaisons for the programs of economic networking, research and development cooperation, 
youth and cultural exchanges, and educational cooperation are primarily with Jewish 
institutions. This arrangement restricts the flow of information to the Arab community and 
excludes their participation. Without the intention of doing so, the association agreement and 
other agreements may actually be widening the gaps between the Jewish majority and the 
Arab minority in Israel.  
Majority-minority relations and the transparent implementation of civil rights are clearly an 
essential priority for the EU, as can be seen from the importance given to reforming the 
treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey as a precondition for accession to the EU. The 
Turkish example shows how the association agreement between the EU and Israel can be used 
as an instrument to respect human rights. By explicitly referring to the Arab minority, the 
association agreement can be used as a method to develop and include this marginalised 
population. To extend this model, the association agreement could be used as an instrument 
that promotes the respect of human rights and even affirmative action for minorities in other 
Mediterranean countries as well, such as the Copt minority in Egypt and the Amazir minority 
in Morocco. 
Among the southern Mediterranean countries participating in the Barcelona process, the State 
of Israel benefits from preferential relations with the European Union. In addition to the Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreement, the Public Procurement Agreements and the 
Agreement in Good Laboratory Practice, Israel is the only Mediterranean non-EU candidate 
country to be associated with the European Community’s Framework Programme for 
Research and Technical Development, benefiting from the same advantages as EU candidate 
countries. But with regard to provisions on the respect for human rights (Article 2 of the EU-
Israel association agreement),
2 the State of Israel fails to comply with its obligations vis-à-vis 
internal policies and legislation. 
The EU plays an important role in the Middle East peace process, both politically and 
economically. Politically, the EU facilitates the peace process through meetings, public 
statements and the diplomatic activities of the Special Envoy to the peace process, 
Ambassador Miguel Moratinos. Economically, the EU is the major donor of humanitarian aid 
                                                 
2 Article 2 states: “Relations between the parties, as well as the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be based 
on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which guides their internal and international policy and 
constitutes an essential element of the Agreement”.  S HIRA KAMM 
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to the Palestinian people, as well as an economic partner with Israel and the neighbouring 
countries of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.  
Until now, the EU has not regarded the Arab minority of Israel as an essential element in 
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Through meetings with European representatives, such as 
Ambassador Moratinos, the EU could utilise the unique position of the Arab citizens in Israel 
to increase understanding between the two sides.  
The EU is active throughout the world, supporting governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to promote democracy, human rights and development. Support for non-
governmental organisations is primarily disbursed through calls for proposals, administrated 
by the European Commission. These calls for proposals are targeted to each country and 
population, aiming to match the need with the appropriate supportive measure. 
Within the framework of these proposals, the European Commission has targeted the Arab 
minority in Israel as a specific issue to be addressed in the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights. The programs specifically call for objectives in the areas of human rights 
education, media and public debate, and improved access to the legal system for women, 
children and the Arab minority. This is an important initiative that demonstrates the European 
recognition of the Arab citizens as a national minority and a most disadvantaged group within 
Israel. 
The particular status of the Arab citizens, as an underdeveloped group within a developed and 
industrial country, has disqualified the Arab minority from most of the European aid 
operations, which take place in developing countries. Due to Israel’s advanced economic 
position, the EU does not consider Israel eligible to receive support for basic development aid. 
Nevertheless, the Arab populations in Israel – particularly the Bedouin residents of 
‘unrecognised’ villages in the Negev and in the North – are in dire need of such aid. 
Recognition of the underdeveloped Arab minority as a distinct population group, separate 
from Israel, would allow development aid it and enable advances in health, nutrition and 
education.  
4.3.3 The European Parliament 
The Delegation of the European Parliament for Relations with Israel is a group of 17 
Members of Parliament that discusses issues concerning EU-Israel relations. The Delegation 
is primarily concerned with issues of foreign policy: the Arab-Israeli conflict, anti-Semitism 
in Europe and relations between individual European countries and Israel. The Delegation 
makes recommendations to the European Parliament that are considered in the formation of 
official European policy.  
Until recently, the European Parliament has not recognised Israel as a country with a national 
minority. The subject of Israel’s Arab citizens has been absent in the context of human and 
minority rights and in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was not until 2001 that the 
Delegation for Relations considered the subject of the Arab minority in Israel.  
In December 2001, a group of Israel’s Arab citizens made a presentation to the Delegation, 
outlining the facts, history and status of the Arab minority. In June 2002, a second group of 
Arab citizens was hosted by a number of MPs to discuss the association agreement and the 
implications of Israel’s treatment of the Arab minority upon the agreement’s implementation. 
Most recently, in November of 2002 and May 2003, the Delegation met with representatives 
of the Arab minority to discuss issues concerning their community in Israel. These are 
favourable developments in the European Parliament’s relations with the Arab minority in 
Israel.  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
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The Delegation for Relations with Israel can express to the Israeli Parliament and government 
its general, deep concern Israel’s material breaches of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement and 
its particular concerns about the internal policies and legislation that lead to institutional 
discrimination against the Arab minority. The Delegation can also provide an informative 
report to the European Parliament Committees on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common 
Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, which discloses the responses of Israeli officials to the 
Delegation’s concerns about Israel’s current implementation of the Agreement. As these 
meetings and presentations continue in the near future, it is hoped that the European 
Parliament and specifically the Delegation will realise the significance of the Arab minority 
and its potential to advance the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
  
 26 
REFERENCES 
Abu-Lughod, Janet (1971), “The Demographic Transformation of Palestine”, in The 
Transformation of Palestine, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.) (1971), Chicago: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed (1999), Dialogue, Conflict Resolution and Change: Arab-Jewish 
Encounters in Israel, New York: State University of New York Press. 
Adalah, the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (1998), “Legal Violations of Arab 
Minority Rights in Israel”, Shfaram, March. 
Adalah, the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (2001), “Historical Background: 
History of the Palestinians in Israel”, Shfaram. 
Adalah, the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (2001), “Historical Background: 
The Palestinian Minority in the Israeli Legal System”, Shfaram. 
Algazy, Joseph (2002), “Mistakenly Killed on a Friday Morning”, Ha’aretz English Edition, 
10 June. 
Algazy, Joseph (2002), “When Life’s a Racist Beach”, Ha’aretz English Edition, 23 July. 
Arab Association for Human Rights, “Land and Planning Policy in Israel”, Article 26, 
Factsheet Series, Nazareth. 
Arabic News.Com (1998), “Israeli-Arab Delegation’s Visit to Syria”, retrieved from 
http:\\www.ArabicNews.com, 25 May. 
Arabic News.Com (1998), “Israeli-Arab Delegation to Visit Syria This Week”, retrieved from 
http:\\www.ArabicNews.com, 17 January. 
Ashkenasi, Abraham (1988), Israeli Politics and Palestinian Fragmentation: Political and 
Social Impacts in Israel and Jerusalem, The Leonard Davis Institute of International 
Relations, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, June. 
Barzilai, Amnon (2002), “More Israeli Jews Favour Transfer of Palestinians, Israeli-Arabs – 
poll finds”, Ha’aretz English Edition, 12 March. 
Benn, Aluf (2002), “Government Backs Bill to Allot State Land for Jewish Use Only”, 
Ha’aretz English Edition, 8 July. 
Davis, Uri (1978), Israel: An Apartheid State, London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Fares, Amin (2000), Analysis of the Annual Survey of the National Insurance Institute, 
Mossawa Centre, Haifa. 
Fares, Amin (2002), Ranking of the Arab Local Councils by Socio-Economic Status, Mossawa 
Centre, Haifa, March. 
Ghanim, As’ad (1996), “Arab Participation in the Knesset: A Reconsideration and 
Examination of Alternatives”, in Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads, Elie Rekhess 
(ed.) (1996), The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel 
Aviv University.  
Halevi, Yossi Klein (2001), “Identity Crisis”, The New Republic, 7 May. 
Hattar, Saad G. (2002), “King Hosts Iftar for Arab Israelis”, Jordan Times, 4 January. 
Hofman, John E. (1988), Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel, Indiana: Wyndham Hall Press.  T HE ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL 
 27 
Horowitz, Uri (2000), “The Arabs of Israel and the Palestinian State”, Strategic Assessment, 
Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, November. 
Horowitz, Uri (2001), “Arab-Israelis and the Events of October 2000: Trends and Attitudes 
toward the State of Israel”, Strategic Assessment, Jaffe Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel 
Aviv University, August. 
Human Rights Watch (2001), “Second Class: Discrimination against Palestinian Arab 
Children in Israel’s Schools”, New York, September. 
Husseisi, Badi and Ami Podhozer (2002), The Jewish Society’s Attitudes towards the Arab 
Minority in Israel, Haifa University. 
Government of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (2002), Second Quarter 2002 Labour 
Force Data, Jerusalem, 22 August. 
Government of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (2002), The Arab Population in Israel, 
Jerusalem, July. 
Government of Israel, the Knesset (1992), Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Jerusalem, 
17 March. 
Israel Democracy Institute (2003), The Democracy Index: The State of the Israeli Democracy, 
Tel Aviv, retrieved from http://www.idi.org.il. 
Jabareen, Dr. Yusuf and Professor Hubert Law-Yona (1998), Planning the Arab Towns in 
Israel: The Case of Land Allocations for Public Purposes, Haifa: The Technion 
Institute. 
Jerusalem Post (1999), “Israel Elections 1999”, 20 May. 
Jordan Times (1998), “Regent Underlines Need to Boost Ties With Arab Israelis”, 1 
November. 
Kafala, Tarik (2000), “Intifada: Then and Now”, BBC News, 8 December (see 
http:\\news.bbc.co.uk). 
Lahoud, Lamia (2002), “Israeli Arab Terrorism on the Rise”, Jerusalem Post, 28 August. 
Levush, Ruth (2001), “A Guide to the Israeli Legal System”, Law Library Resource Xchange 
(http:\\www.llrx.com), October. 
Mana, Adel (1996), “Identity in Crisis: The Arabs in Israel and the Israel-PLO Agreement”, 
Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads, Elie Rekhess (ed.), The Moshe Dayan Centre 
for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. 
Mossawa Centre (2001), “Report on the Social, Economic and Political Status of Arab 
Citizens of Israel”, Haifa. 
Mossawa Centre (2002), “Killed and Ignored: The Killing of Arab Citizens of Israel by Israeli 
Security Forces”, Haifa, October.  
Nahhas-Daoud, Alhan (2002), The Constitutional Status of the Arab Citizens of Israel, 
Mossawa Centre, Haifa, March. 
Neuberger, Binyamin (1996), “Trends in the Political Organisation of the Arabs of Israel”, 
Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads, Elie Rekhess (ed.), The Moshe Dayan Centre 
for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University.  
Nir, Uri (2001), “Special Report Elections 2001”, Ha’ aretz, 2 February.  S HIRA KAMM 
 28 
Palestine-Net (2003), “Geography of Palestine: Destroyed Palestinian Villages (1948)”, 
retrieved 19 May 2003, from http://www.palestine-
net.com/geography/cleansed/byindex.html. 
Paz, Reuven (2000), “The Israeli Arabs: Defending Al-Aqsa or Fighting for Equality?”, Peace 
Watch, No. 281, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 October. 
Pipes, Daniel (1986-87), “Two Bus Lines to Bethlehem”, National Interest, Winter. 
Provisional Government of Israel (1948), Declaration of the Establishment of the State of 
Israel, Jerusalem, 14 May. 
Quigley, John (1990), “Divide and Conquer: Arabs in Israel’s Political System”, Palestine 
and Israel: A Challenge to Justice, London: Duke University Press. 
Shipler, David K (1986), Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land, New York: 
Penguin Books. 
Shragai, Nadav (2002), “Eitam: No Sovereignty for Arabs in Eretz Israel”, Ha’aretz English 
Edition, 8 April. 
US Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress (1998), Country Studies, 
Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. 
Zureik, Elia (1979), “The Politicisation of Israeli Arabs”, The Palestinians in Israel: A Study 
in Internal Colonialism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. CENTRE FOR
EUROPEAN
POLICY
STUDIES
ABOUT CEPS
ounded in 1983, the  Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales.
GOALS
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence.
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process.
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of
Europe.
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events.
ASSETS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence.
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to  analyse policy
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion.
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to climate
change, JHA and economic analysis.
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with
extensive working experience in EU affairs.
PROGRAMME STRUCTURE
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems and
opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its publications
and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research programme is
organised under two major headings:
Economic Policy
Macroeconomic Policy
European Network of Economic Policy
       Research Institutes (ENEPRI)
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)
Trade Developments & Policy
Energy, Environment & Climate Change
Agricultural Policy
Politics, Institutions and Security
The Future of Europe
Justice and Home Affairs
The Wider Europe
South East Europe
Caucasus & Black Sea
EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations
Mediterranean & Middle East
CEPS-IISS European Security Forum
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings,
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and media
relations.
Place du Congrès 1 ￿ B-1000 Brussels ￿ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ￿ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 ￿ http://www.ceps.be
F